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Conventional wisdom is that sovereigns will rarely, if ever, default on their 
external debts in circumstances where it is clear that they have the capacity 
to pay.  The first line of defense against the errant sovereign is its concern 
about reputation.  It may have to tap the external debt markets again in the 
future; and there is the fear that the markets will extract revenge.  But 
reputational constraints do not always work because some governments 
heavily discount future costs in favor of current benefits.  When reputational 
constraints fail, however, a second line of defense is supposed to come into 
play.  That line of defense is comprised of contractual and legal remedies.
Both lines of defense broke down in the case of Ecuador’s default in late 
2008.  The breakdown of the second line of defense is significant because 
this was the first time that the modern theory of supermajority creditor control 
of sovereign debt problems was tested in practice.  This Article begins the 
coroner’s inquest into the reasons for this breakdown and how similar 
situations might be averted in the future.
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In late 2008, the Republic of Ecuador defaulted on its 
international bonds.  This was not a novel occurrence.  In a study published 
in 1993 (“The Risks of Sovereign Lending:  Lessons from History,” Sept. 
1993), Salomon Brothers concluded that Ecuador had the worst debt 
performance record of any of the 70 payment-challenged countries they 
surveyed.  There have been two additional defaults since 1993.  But this 
latest default was certainly different.  Two highly concessional debt 
restructurings (one in 1995 and the second in 2000), together with record 
high oil prices, had left Ecuador in 2008 with an enviably manageable 
external debt profile.
The motivation for this default was domestic politics, not 
financial necessity.  It was the first time in modern history that a sovereign 
debtor had demanded that its external commercial creditors write off most of 
their claims (65 percent, as it turned out), without advancing a plausible 
argument that financial distress warranted such extraordinary debt relief.
The demise of the doctrine of “absolute” sovereign immunity in 
the second half of the last century left sovereign debt markets operating on 
the assumption that the menacing prospect of legal enforcement of debt 
contracts, coupled with a fear of market exclusion and the prospect of a 
censorious raised eyebrow from the multilateral financial institutions, would 
act as an effective brake on casual sovereign defaults.  In the Ecuador case, 
however, the system designed to protect the interests of the bondholders 
against such a default failed.  The creditors were left with no feasible option 
apart from knuckling under to a demand that they forgive 65 percent of their 
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claims against a sovereign debtor that visibly had the resources to continue 
servicing those obligations.
The questions now are how could this have happened and 
what needs to change in order to ensure that the traditional legal balance 
between sovereign debtors and their commercial creditors is restored? 
The Historical Context
There has been a steady movement over the last 15 years 
toward supermajority creditor control of sovereign debt workouts.  The 
textual evidence of this is visible in the documentation used for the issuance 
of bonds by emerging market sovereigns.  For example: 
 Acceleration of bonds following an event of default now typically 
requires a vote of at least 25% of the bondholders (as opposed to 
the traditional format that permitted each bondholder to accelerate 
its own bonds following an event of default). 
 Collective action clauses, first introduced into New York law 
sovereign bonds in 2003, are now standard in most emerging 
market sovereign bonds.  These clauses permit the payment terms 
of the bonds to be amended with the consent of 75% of the 
bondholders.  Prior to this innovation, the payment terms of a New 
York law-governed sovereign bond could not be altered without the 
unanimous consent of the bondholders.   
 An increasing number of these bonds are being issued pursuant to 
trust indentures in the New York market and trust deeds in the 
London market (in contrast to the fiscal agency structures used in 
prior periods).  Trustees represent the interests of the 
bondholders; fiscal agents are agents of the issuer of the bonds 
and owe no fiduciary duties to the bondholders.
 Most recently, several New York law trust indentures for sovereign 
bonds have centralized all powers to enforce the bonds in the 
hands of the trustee.  The traditional U.S. practice (an invariable 
practice in corporate bonds) permits each bondholder to sue for its 
share of a payment that was not made on a scheduled maturity 
date.  Full centralization of enforcement powers in the hands of the 
trustee has long been the norm in English law trust deeds. 
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The principal motivation for these documentary changes was a 
desire to replicate, in the sovereign context, the supermajority creditor control 
of debt workouts that exists in most corporate insolvency regimes.  If 
unforeseen circumstances prevent normal servicing of the debts, the 
proponents of this approach argued, the judgment of the large majority of the 
creditors should control whether and how to adjust payment terms in 
response to those circumstances.  Individual creditors should not be given an 
opportunity to disrupt a consensual restructuring or to exploit the 
concessions granted by the vast number of their fellow lenders.
Supermajority creditor control, however, never implied that 
bondholders would forfeit their rights to enforce their claims through legal 
proceedings.  In particular, the movement toward the use of trust structures 
for emerging market sovereign bonds was not intended to dilute creditors’ 
legal rights, but merely to centralize those powers in the hands of a trustee 
who would exercise those rights for the ratable benefit of all creditors.
Naturally, this approach assumed that the entity appointed to exercise these 
centralized powers (the trustee) would, if and when necessary, acquit itself of 
its duty to preserve, protect and defend the interests of the bondholders. 
These assumptions, and this legal architecture, were tested for 
the first time in connection with Ecuador’s 2008 default on two series of its 
bonds and the country’s subsequent offer to repurchase those bonds at a 
very deep discount.  As things turned out, the assumptions proved to be 
fragile and the legal architecture failed in its principal purpose. 
The Default
The latest Ecuador default had its origins in the Ecuadorian 
presidential election of 2006.  One of the candidates, Rafael Correa, 
campaigned on a platform that implicitly promised to redirect into social 
programs a large portion of the money that Ecuador devoted to making 
payments on its external debt.  The fly in the buttermilk, as Correa (an 
economist by training) must certainly have known, was that Ecuador’s debt 
burden was actually quite manageable. The country had, just the year 
before (2005), issued bonds in the international markets highlighting its very 
favorable debt ratios.  Correa himself had been the Ecuadorian Minister of 
Finance for a portion of 2005 while that bond issue was being prepared. 
Correa’s campaign message found favor with the Ecuadorian 
electorate and he became President of the country in January 2007.  Lacking 
a financial justification for demanding concessions from the country’s 
creditors, the Correa administration decided that it would seek a legal pretext 
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for its hostile debt policy.  The slogans for this were lying conveniently at 
hand courtesy of the academic debate about the early twentieth century 
doctrine of “odious” sovereign debts; a debate that had rekindled following 
the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The original (circa 1927) doctrine 
defined odious debt very narrowly, too narrowly it seems for the taste of 
some modern commentators.  This may explain the shift in terminology 
toward an even less precise, but apparently more inclusive, category of 
“illegitimate” debts. 
Shortly after taking office in 2006, Correa appointed a 
“Commission of Integral Audit of Public Credit” and ordered it to examine 
Ecuador’s foreign debts.  That Commission, composed principally of local 
and foreign activists for third world debt cancellation, duly reported its finding 
that virtually all of Ecuador’s external debt stock was fatally tainted by 
illegality and illegitimacy.   
The Commission’s standards for identifying illegitimate/illegal 
debts were always original and occasionally risible.  To give just a flavor, the 
Commission concluded that the wickedness, corruption and incompetence of 
Ecuador’s debt negotiators over the prior 30 years were revealed by the 
negotiators’ supine acceptance of contractual provisions such as a choice of 
foreign governing law, submission to foreign court jurisdiction and waiver of 
sovereign immunity.
When the Correa administration took office, Ecuador had three 
outstanding international bond issues, two had been issued in 2000 as part 
of the settlement of Ecuador’s last default on its Brady Bond and Eurobond 
debt.  Shortly after the official release of the Commission’s report, Ecuador 
ceased payments on both of these bonds.  A third external bond, issued in 
2005 (the year in which Correa had served a stint as finance minister), 
continued to be serviced.
The Buyback Offer
Following the default in November 2008, the market price of 
Ecuador’s bonds sank into the low 20s (the bonds had been trading at or 
close to par as recently as end-2007.)  Rumors quickly circulated that the 
Government of Ecuador had embarked on a program to acquire (through two 
financial intermediaries) between 30-50% of the total outstanding amount of 
the two defaulted bonds at the deeply discounted prices occasioned by the 
Government’s default and threats of default. 
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On April 20, 2009, six months after the first default, Ecuador 
launched a cash buyback offer to repurchase the two series of defaulted 
bonds.  The transaction was structured as a modified Dutch auction with a 
minimum price of 30 cents on the dollar of outstanding principal.
The disclosure document that accompanied the buyback offer 
had several features that bear upon this story: 
 The Government utterly repudiated the two bonds it was 
seeking to repurchase; holders were told that Ecuador had 
no intention of ever resuming normal payments on those 
instruments.
 Although the indenture governing the two defaulted bonds 
expressly treated any bonds owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by Ecuador as “not outstanding” for voting 
purposes, the offering document failed to disclose whether 
any bonds were then under the ownership or control of 
Ecuador and, if so, how many. 
 Ecuador threatened in the offering document to place the 
repurchased bonds in the hands of a nominee whom “the 
Republic does not control”, and then to convene a 
bondholders’ meeting for the purpose of amending 
(unspecified) provisions of the old bonds.  The fatuity of the 
proposition that Ecuador would hand over the repurchased 
bonds to a truly independent, “vote your conscience”, 
custodian did not diminish the potency of the threat that the 
Government would try to circumvent the indenture’s 
protections in this regard. 
 Any doubt that this was a “willingness to pay”, not a 
“capacity to pay,” driven default was removed by a perusal 
of the disclosure document. External debt to GDP, for 
example, was disclosed to be less than 20% and total debt 
to GDP stood at 26.1%.  By contrast, Ecuador’s debt to 
GDP at the time of its prior debt restructuring in 2000 was 
100.5%.
 The disclosure document was accompanied by a transmittal 
letter from the Ecuadorian Minister of Finance.  The Minister 
characterized the findings of the Commission of Integral 
Audit concerning the illegality/illegitimacy of Ecuador’s 
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The Theory
The trust indenture that governed the two series of defaulted 
Ecuadorian bonds set out the bondholders’ legal remedies following a 
default.  Holders of 25% (in principal amount) of each series could accelerate 
their series by notice to the trustee.  The indenture, however, carefully 
preserved for the trustee the discretion to accelerate the bonds on its own 
volition, without waiting for a bondholders’ vote.  This power was presumably 
to be exercised in extreme cases when time was of the essence or the 
character of the default and the issuer’s intentions were unambiguously 
hostile to the interests of the bondholders.
To safeguard the integrity of this voting process, the indenture 
treated as “not outstanding” any bonds owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by the issuer.  If the trustee was in any doubt about whether the 
issuer had reacquired its own bonds, the indenture gave the trustee the 
power to demand a certification to this effect from the issuer.  The issuer was 
required to respond “promptly”. 
Following the occurrence of an Event of Default, the trustee 
was given the discretionary power “to protect and enforce the rights vested in 
it by this Indenture by such appropriate judicial proceedings as the Trustee 
shall deem most effectual …”.  Apart from this discretionary authority, an 
enforcement action for the recovery of an accelerated amount required the 
holders of 25% of the outstanding bonds of a series to request the trustee to 
commence such an action and to offer the trustee an indemnity against its 
costs, expenses and liabilities incurred in doing so.  The indenture specified 
that the trustee had 60 days in which to decide whether it would enforce the 
bonds after receiving such a request; if the trustee failed to do so within this 
time period, enforcement rights reverted to the bondholders. 
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The Reality
Practice did not live up to theory.  Even though the issuer had 
publicly repudiated the instruments (it’s hard to imagine a more serious 
provocation), the trustee did not exercise its discretion to accelerate either 
series of bonds or to commence an enforcement action.  The holders of one 
series eventually mustered the 25% vote needed to force the trustee to 
accelerate that series, but the authors understand that the second series 
missed the 25% voting threshold by just a small amount. 
Because any bonds owned or controlled by Ecuador should 
have been deemed “not outstanding” for purposes of these votes, the trustee 
never actually knew the size of the universe of bondholders entitled to vote 
for acceleration or to request an enforcement action.  And without knowing 
the denominator of the voting fraction, the trustee obviously could never 
ascertain whether the votes it had received constituted the necessary 25%. 
The authors understand that the trustee asked for a prompt 
certification from Ecuador as to the number of bonds it owned or controlled; a 
demand that Ecuador seems to have ignored.  The trustee was apparently 
not prepared to draw a negative inference from this further breach of the 
indenture and continued its policy of refusing to accelerate the instruments 
on its own volition.  (By way of comparison, the trustee for Ecuador’s 1997 
Eurobonds did accelerate those bonds on its own volition.) 
Now in a normal situation -- one in which a borrower stops 
paying its debts because it lacks the money to do so -- this passivity on the 
part of the trustee may have just delayed what would in any event have been 
a painfully drawn out enforcement process.  But Ecuador was far from being 
an impecunious debtor, as evidenced by the fact that within six months of the 
default it had launched a cash tender for its own bonds.  Once the buyback 
operation was announced, everyone knew that within a matter of a couple of 
months the issuer would be forced to mobilize -- at a specific place on a 
specific day -- the hundreds of millions of dollars needed to close the 
buyback with the tendering bondholders.
Whether those funds could have been shielded from 
attachment by an aggressive trustee is a question to which we shall never 
know the answer.  But this much seems certain -- the closing of the cash 
buyback represented the first, the best and perhaps the only opportunity for 
the creditors to recover a sizeable portion of their claims.  The trust indenture 
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deprived the individual bondholders of their ability to pursue legal remedies 
on their own; they were thus wholly reliant on the trustee’s vigilance and 
enterprise to protect their interests. 
When it became clear that their contractually-appointed 
champion was not eager to enter the lists, most of the bondholders 
apparently felt that they had little choice but to accept Ecuador’s buyback 
offer.  The final price of 35¢ on the dollar was accepted by holders of 
approximately 91% of the bonds. 
Contractual Changes
Was this just an isolated case of a bovinely passive trustee, or 
should there be changes in the standard forms of New York law trust 
indentures for sovereign issues that would prevent this sort of mischief from 
recurring?
Trustee Responsibilities.  The form of trust indenture that has 
been used for the last ten years for sovereign bond issues differs in one very 
material respect from the trust indentures used for publicly-issued corporate 
debt securities in the United States.  The latter, reflecting an explicit 
requirement of the U.S. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, imposes on a trustee 
only administrative duties -- right up to the point that an event of default has 
occurred.  After a default, the trustee’s fiduciary responsibilities ratchet up 
sharply.  A trustee for a corporate debt issue, confronted with a default, must 
exercise such of the rights and powers vested in it by the indenture, and use 
the same degree of care and skill in their exercise, as a prudent man would 
use under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.  This is a fairly 
high fiduciary standard. 
A contractual provision mandating a higher post-default 
standard of trustee responsibility is missing from the form of trust indenture 
that has been used for New York sovereign bond issues, including the two 
defaulted Ecuador bonds.  At some point in its drafting history, someone 
(probably a lawyer representing a trustee) realized that sovereign trust 
indentures do not need to comply with the requirements of the U.S. Trust 
Indenture Act.  That drafter accordingly seized the opportunity to strip out of 
the document the provision that contains the living, beating heart of a 
trustee’s contractual fiduciary duty to its debtholders.  And after this bit of 
surgery, the document was replicated again and again for future deals, as 
standard financial contracts often are.  Whatever one’s views about the 
propriety of the trustee’s behavior in the recent Ecuador affair, therefore, the 
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trust indenture in question did not require more aggressive action by the 
trustee.
The Ecuador case demonstrated how a sovereign debtor can 
exploit this documentary weakness if it is determined to do so.  The authors 
can see no reason why trust indentures used for future sovereign issues 
should not follow the corporate model and impose more stringent 
responsibilities on a trustee to protect the interests of the debtholders once 
the instrument goes into default. 
Orphans and Mercy.   When a secondary market in the trading 
of commercial bank loans to sovereign borrowers began in the mid-1980s, 
the banks quickly realized that it invited howling moral hazard.  A sovereign 
debtor could default on its interest payments, drive down the secondary 
market price of its paper and then use the money it should have paid in 
interest to repurchase and cancel the debt in full.  Default thus became the 
enticing prelude to sound debt management.  The phenomenon was 
described in these pages (IFLR, April 1991 at 10,11) as being equivalent to 
the old saw about the boy who murders his parents and hurls himself on the 
mercy of the court as an orphan. 
The banks tried to arrest this temptation by including clauses in 
their restructuring agreements that forbade a borrower from directly or 
indirectly acquiring interests in its own debts at any time that those loans 
were in default.  The banks recognized, of course, that a borrower willing to 
default on a loan might not balk at breaching a covenant of this kind.  But the 
banks believed that third-party financial intermediaries -- the ones who 
quietly repurchased debts on the secondary market for sovereign clients -- 
would be reluctant to collude in such an explicit breach. 
These prohibitions against a borrower repurchasing its 
defaulted debts were carried over into the Brady bonds that replaced the 
commercial bank loans in the early 1990s.  Ecuador’s Brady bonds, for 
example, had just such a restriction.  The clauses were unobtrusively 
dropped, however, from the new Eurobonds and Yankee bonds issued by 
these countries later in the 1990s.  The justification, if there was one, must 
have been that no sovereign bond issuer would risk its market reputation by 
deliberately defaulting in order to manipulate the price of its bond to its own 
benefit.
That theory is probably correct, but it does not account for the 
possibility that politicians in the debtor country might order a cessation of 
payments for domestic political reasons.  In these circumstances, the legal 
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ability to repurchase defaulted debts makes the debtor the principal 
beneficiary of its own default.  Add a deliberate concealment of the true 
beneficial ownership of the bonds to frustrate syndicate voting, a complaisant 
trustee and a widely-dispersed bondholder class, and the result can be an 
effective emasculation of creditor legal remedies. 
Sovereign Defaults
The 1993 Salomon Brothers study referred to in the opening 
paragraph of this article ended with a comforting assurance to prospective 
investors in sovereign debt paper.  “Countries do not default lightly,” said the 
Salomon report.  “The cases of pure ‘unwillingness to pay’ are few and occur 
under circumstances of extreme political instability.” 
That conclusion accurately summarized the prior 200 years of 
historical sovereign debt performance.  If the Ecuador example proves 




Duties and Responsibilities of the Trustee
The Trustee undertakes to perform such duties and only such 
duties as are specifically set forth in this Indenture and the Terms.  No 
provision of this Indenture shall be construed to relieve the Trustee from 
liability for its own grossly negligent action, its own grossly negligent failure to 
act or its own willful misconduct, except that: 
(a) (i) the duties and obligations of the Trustee shall be 
determined solely by the express provisions of this Indenture, 
and the Trustee shall not be liable except for the performance 
of such duties and obligations as are specifically set forth in this 
Indenture, and no implied covenants or obligations shall be 
read into this Indenture against the Trustee; … 
* * * * 
Recommended Version*
Duties of Trustee
(a) If an Event of Default has occurred and is continuing, the 
Trustee shall exercise such of the rights and powers vested in it 
by this Indenture, and use the same degree of care and skill in 
their exercise, as a prudent man would exercise or use under 
the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs. 
(b) Except during the continuance of an Event of Default: 
(i) The Trustee need perform only those duties that are 
specifically set forth in this Indenture and no others. … 
* * * * 
                                           
*From American Bar Association, Model Simplified Indenture. 
